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Private Prisons, Private Governance:  
Essay On Developments In Private-Sector 
Resistance To Privatized Immigration Detention 
Danielle C. Jefferis* 
INTRODUCTION 
Two diametrically opposed events impacting America’s for-profit prison industry 
occurred within two weeks of each other in 2019. On March 19, 2019, the U.S. Supreme 
Court announced its opinion in Nielsen v. Preap.1 In that case, a majority of  justices upheld 
a broad interpretation of the federal government’s immigration detention authority with 
respect to certain noncitizens in removal proceedings.2 In effect, the Court’s decision 
expanded the category of people subject to mandatory migration-related confinement—a 
system of incarceration that currently incarcerates more than 50,000 people per day in 
mostly private prisons and continues to expand.3 The decision marked a victory for the 
private prison industry.  
However, just two weeks prior, the industry experienced a significant loss. In an 
unprecedented move, JPMorgan Chase, one of the nation’s largest banks, announced it 
would no longer finance or invest in private prison corporations.4 Wells Fargo soon 
followed.5 These banks’ divestment from the private-prison industry represented a loss of 
millions of dollars of capital for the corporations managing and profiting from privatized 
immigration detention, sending a compelling signal from Wall Street that a company’s 
support for the Trump administration’s “zero-tolerance” policy of immigration 
enforcement matters. Stocks of the two largest private-prison companies took a drastic hit 
in the aftermath of the banks’ announcements.6 Soon, at least six more of the nation’s 
 
* Clinical Teaching Fellow, Civil Rights Clinic, University of Denver College of Law. I am grateful to the 
work of the Northwestern Journal of Law and Social Policy Volume 15 Board of Editors. One of the 
primary challenges in writing a piece about an industry that is changing as rapidly as the subject of this one 
is ensuring the accounts, analysis, and sources are as up-to-date as possible. I have endeavored to meet that 
challenge here but any errors on that front or others are mine. 
1 139 S. Ct. 954 (2019).  
2 Id. 
3 See infra Subpart I(B).  
4 See, e.g., Emily S. Rueb, JPMorgan Chase Stops Funding Private Prison Companies, and Immigration 
Activists Applaud, N.Y. TIMES (Mar. 6, 2019), https://www.nytimes.com/2019/03/06/business/jp-morgan-
prisons.html. 
5 Dennis Carter, Bank of America is Now the Only Big Bank ‘Profiting from Family Separation’, REWIRE 
NEWS (Apr. 10, 2019), https://rewire.news/article/2019/04/10/bank-of-america-is-now-the-only-big-bank-
profiting-from-family-separation/. 
6 Morgan Simon, In Wake of Wells Fargo Hearing, Private Prison Stocks Take Big Hit, FORBES (Mar. 15, 
2019), https://www.forbes.com/sites/morgansimon/2019/03/15/in-wake-of-wells-fargo-hearing-private-
prison-stocks-take-big-hit/#535e7aa91a3b (reporting stocks of two largest private-prison companies, GEO 
Group and CoreCivic, dropped sixteen and eight percent respectively in the day following banks’ 
divestment announcement). 
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largest banks had committed publicly to ending financing for the private-prison industry, 
leaving the industry with a reported eighty-seven percent financing gap, falling credit 
ratings, and investor fallback.7 By October 2019, all publicly known banking partners for 
one of the industry’s leaders had committed to withdrawing their financial support, and the 
leading stock prices for the industry’s top companies were “near historic lows.”8 
For advocates of decarceration and more humane immigration-enforcement 
protocols, the banks’ divestment from the private prison industry is one development in a 
series of efforts of people and organizations disavowing expectations of humane public 
governance and, instead, insisting and relying on private governance institutions to impose 
accountability and push for change. When the government fails to govern, people and 
groups may turn to private governance mechanisms to challenge the status quo.9 Private 
governance institutions are the means by which indivdiuals, organizations, and 
communities aim to address the needs that public governance has failed to address.10 In 
other words, “[p]rivate governance institutions provide governance without 
government.”11 As for Chase, Wells Fargo, and the finance companies that followed them, 
the banks’ exits from the private prison industry came after directed campaigns by 
advocates and activists demanding the companies cease support for corporations 
responsible for the Trump administration’s immigration-enforcement policies.12 Of the 
numerous recent examples of private governance action in the field of private prisons, this 
Essay describes certain shareholder actions and divestment activities.13  
In examining shareholder actions and divestment activities in this Essay, I write 
through the lens of decarceration—that is, from the premise that the the elimination of 
privatized confinement on all levels is the goal14—and I focus on privatized federal 
immigration detention. I do this for two reasons: first, the U.S. immigration detention 
system is the most privatized in the world and is significantly more privatized than the 
system of criminal incarceration.15 Second, with respect to immigration enforcement, the 
federal government has demonstrated a recent commitment to governing in a manner 
 
7 Morgan Simon, GEO Group Running Out of Banks as 100% of Known Banking Partners Say ‘No’ to the 
Private Prison Sector, FORBES (Sept. 30, 2019), 
https://www.forbes.com/sites/morgansimon/2019/09/30/geo-group-runs-out-of-banks-as-100-of-banking-
partners-say-no-to-the-private-prison-sector/#63c7c2273298 (last updated Oct. 11, 2019).  
8 Id.  
9 See, e.g., Tracey M. Roberts, Innovations in Governance: A Functional Typology of Private Governance 
Institutions, 22 DUKE ENVTL. L. & POL’Y F. 67, 67 (2011).  
10 Id. (citing Charlotte Hess & Elinor Ostrom, Introduction to UNDERSTANDING KNOWLEDGE AS A 
COMMONS: FROM THEORY TO PRACTICE 3, 8-9 (Charlotte Hess & Elinor Ostrom eds., 2008) (“Private 
governance institutions are limitless in their variety. Political science, sociology, law, and economics 
literature describes hundreds of variations of private governance institutions throughout the world that have 
developed their own community-based rules for resource management and conflict resolution.”). 
11 Roberts, supra note 9. 
12 See Rueb, supra note 4. 
13 Professor Jonathan M. Gilligan refers to these two private governance institutions as carrots and sticks—
shareholder actions being the carrots, enticing industry actors to engage for purposes of change, and 
divestment actions being the sticks, signifying an exit from the industry. See generally Jonathan M. 
Gilligan, Carrots and Sticks in Private Climate Governance, 6 TEX. A&M L. REV. 179 (2018).  
14 See generally Sharon Dolovich, State Punishment and Private Prisons, 55 DUKE L.J. 437 (2005). 
15 MARY SMALL, DET. WATCH NETWORK, A TOXIC RELATIONSHIP: PRIVATE PRISONS AND U.S. 
IMMIGRATION DETENTION 2 (2016) (“[I]n addition to being remarkable for its size, the U.S. immigration 
detention system is an outlier for the degree to which it has been privatized.”).   
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contrary to the goals of decarceration. The government is also is uniquely situated to evade 
certain public governance measures, particularly efforts by state or local jurisdictions 
seeking to govern in this area, due in part to issues of federalism.  
Private governance actions may be one method to draw attention to the scope of and 
conditions in for-profit immigration detention centers, to improve those conditions, and to 
stop the overall growth of the immigration detention apparatus. This Essay has three parts. 
Part I describes the state of privatized confinement in the United States, from the history 
of for-profit imprisonment to its modern scope to the conditions in private immigration 
prisons across the United States. Part II describes the shortcomings of public governance 
to advance the goal of decarceration or, at minimum, exercise sufficient oversight of the 
private-prison industry. Part III then examines recent shareholder and divestment actions 
targeted at the for-profit prison industry, specifically privatized immigration detention.  
I. THE STATE OF PRIVATE CONFINEMENT IN AMERICA 
Commercial interests in American incarceration have existed for centuries, gaining 
prominence first with the emergence of prison labor exploitation on plantations throughout 
the antebellum South.16 While America’s system of incarceration is arguably more 
regulated today than it was then, the private sector has nonetheless retained a significant 
stakehold in all confinement systems, including immigration-related confinement.17 This 
Part provides a brief history of privatized confinement and sketches the scope of modern 
private immigration detention, as well as the conditions in the prisons where the federal 
government confines people for putatively “civil” reasons.18  
A. History  
The private sector has played a notable role in American confinement since at least 
the Reconstruction era.19 As criminal punishment in the United States transitioned from the 
use of capital punishment, banishment, and public flogging to the use of incarceration, state 
and local governments began searching for ways to account for the cost of confining people 
for lengthier periods of time.20 One way to do this was to force the people in the 
government’s custody to work. The modern private prison industry grew out the 
antebellum practice of forced labor on prison plantations, which themselves grew out of 
slavery and other labor-driven industries.21 As Professor Sharon Dolovich explains in her 
 
16 SHANE BAUER, AMERICAN PRISON 16–21 (Penguin Press eds. 2018); Sharon Dolovich, supra note 14, at 
450–51 (“In the early [American] penitentiaries, prison labor was introduced as part of rehabilitative 
programs, but it quickly became the means through which state governments could recoup the costs to the 
state treasury of imprisoning criminals. Indeed, the history of nineteenth-century American prisons is a 
history of contracting between the state and private interests for the use of convict labor in efforts on both 
sides to achieve financial gain.”).  
17 See, e.g., EMILY RYO AND IAN PEACOCK, The Landscape of Immigration Detention in the United States, 
AM. IMMIGR. COUNCIL 1, 14 (2018) (approximately two-thirds of the daily population of immigration 
detainees are confined in for-profit prisons).  
18 See generally René Lima-Marín & Danielle C. Jefferis, It’s Just Like Prison: Is a Civil (Nonpunitive) 
System of Immigration Detention Theoretically Possible?, 96 DENV. L. REV. 955 (2019).  
19 SHANE BAUER, supra note 16, at 16–21; Sharon Dolovich, supra note 14, at 450–51.  
20 Dolovich, supra note 14, at 450–51.  
21 Bauer, supra note 16, at 19; Dolovich, supra note 14, at 451 (“Although convict leasing was found 
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detailed account of the history of commercial interests and American incarceration, “At the 
[Civil W]ar’s end, demand for convict labor was high, as those who had previously relied 
on slave labor found themselves in need of a pool of cheap workers.”22 Some plantations 
and factories were privately owned; others were government-run.23 All, however, profited 
from enslaved labor.24  
Later, from the end of the nineteenth century to the early-to-mid twentieth century, 
prison labor contracts became frought with controversy and corruption.25 Conditions for 
the people in the prisons and the labor camps were dreadful and featured severe abuse and 
“utter indifference to whether [prisoners] lived or died.”26 Private companies also began to 
take advantage of the governments with which they contracted, failing to perform to the 
contracts’ full terms and then fighting states’ legal battles in court.27 This era of 
commercialized incarceration soon gave way to the modern system that emerged in the 
1980s. This was a system that bears simultaneously different and similar features when 
compared to the one of the last century, much like the American carceral enterprise as a 
whole.28 
 
throughout the nineteenth-century United States, it was most widely used in the Southern states after the 
Civil War. This development was in part a function of the serious financial straits of the former 
Confederate states in the postwar years; convict leasing offered a way both to defray the costs of 
incarceration and to rebuild the shattered Southern economy.”). 
22 Dolovich, supra note 14, at 451.  
23 Bauer, supra note 16, at 19; Dolovich, supra note 14, at 451 (“These contracts [between state and private 
interests] took many forms. In some cases, as with New York’s Auburn penitentiary, contractors would 
supply the raw material and collect the finished product at the end, with the work taking place at the prison. 
In others, as in Louisiana, the state leased its entire penitentiary to a private contractor, who then assumed 
the cost of running the facility in exchange for the labor of its inmates. The most common arrangements, 
however, involved the leasing of convict labor for work on plantations, on railroads, in mines, or in other 
labor-intensive industries.”). 
24 Bauer, supra note 16, at 19 (“Like prison systems throughout the South, Texas’s grew directly out of 
slavery. After the Civil War the state’s economy was in disarray, and cotton and sugar planters suddenly 
found themselves without hands they could force to work. Fortunately, for them, the Thirteenth 
Amendment, which abolished slavery, left a loophole. It said that ‘neither slavery nor involuntary 
servitude’ shall exist in the United States ‘except as punishment for a crime.’ As long as black men were 
convicted of crimes, Texas could lease all of its prisoners to private cotton and sugar plantations and 
companies running lumber camps and coal mines, and building railroads. It did this for five decades after 
the abolition of slavery, but the state eventually became jealous of the revenue private companies and 
planters were earning from its prisoners. So, between 1899 and 1918, the state bought ten plantations of its 
own and began running them as prisons.”).  
25 Dolovich, supra note 14, at 452–53 (detailing conflict between public and private interests as prison 
labor contracts grew more and more popular). 
26 Id. at 452 (“Because the prisons ensured a steady supply of convicts, from the contractors’ perspective 
one convict was as good as another. Many contractors therefore routinely worked their charges literally to 
death.”); see also Bauer, supra note 16, at 16–20 (recounting the experience of Albert Race Sample, a man 
in prison in Texas and forced to work on a cotton plantation in 1956).  
27 Dolovich, supra note 14, at 452–53 (“Historical accounts of inmate labor contracts in nineteenth-century 
America reveal that the practice was plagued by more than inmate abuse. In addition, state after state found 
itself being outmaneuvered and taken advantage of by the private parties with whom the state had 
contracted for the labor of its convicts . . . The predominant theme of accounts of prison labor contracts 
gone awry is the state’s vulnerability to nonperformance by its contracting partner once the state had 
divested itself of responsibility for its prisoners.”).  
28 Id. at 454 (“It would be a mistake to draw too many conclusions from this history for the current chapter 
of private sector involvement in prisons. The contemporary experience is governed by a set of norms, not in 
place a century ago, forbidding the economic exploitation and physical abuse of inmates. Today, there is 
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The 1980s saw a rise in incarceration on a mass scale on the criminal and civil sides 
as well as a reemergence of privatized confinement.29 As state governments began 
throwing more people behind bars, they needed space to confine them. Publicly run jails 
and prisons were soon filled to capacity.30 Thus, the private sector stepped in to provide 
that space.31 
B. Privatized Immigration Detention 
The modern for-profit prison sector is linked inextricably with immigration 
detention.32 Indeed, the first privately owned prison in the United States was an 
immigration prison.33 The early 1980s saw the arrival of large numbers of Cuban and 
Haitian migrants and refugees.34 As a result the Corrections Corporation of America 
(CCA), now known as CoreCivic,35 opened the Houston Processing Center, a motel that 
was  converted to an immigration detention center, in Houston, Texas.36 CCA co-founder 
Tom Beasley described on national radio the casual manner in which he launched his 
exceedingly profitable business model in partnership with former pastor and prison 
plantation warden, T. Don Hutto:37 
Don Hutto and I went down to Houston on New Year’s Eve in 1983. We 
rented a car at the airport and drove around the major thoroughfares to find 
 
also a stricter standard of political accountability, an extensive public bureaucracy with the capacity to 
regulate and administer complex institutions, and the default expectation that the state bears the burden of 
financing the prison system. But as will be seen, this history does introduce certain themes arising from 
private involvement in corrections that are still relevant today.”). 
29 See, e.g., Danielle C. Jefferis, Constitutionally Unaccountable: Privatized Immgration Detention, 95 
INDIANA L.J. ___ (forthcoming 2019) (on file with author); Dolovich, supra note 14, at 455 (“The 
reemergence of private contractors in American corrections is traceable to the dramatic growth in 
incarceration nationwide over the past three decades. In 1985, there were over 740,000 people behind bars, 
up from 226,000 ten years previously.”).  
30 Dolovich, supra note 14, at 455 (“Initially, state officials nationwide responded to the first of these 
problems—finding room for all the bodies—by shipping convicted offenders to existing penal facilities and 
letting the wardens sort it out themselves. The limitations of this approach, however, were soon clear, as 
prisons and jails quickly came to be operating well over capacity.”). 
31 Id. at 455–56.  
32 For a fuller account of the rise of modern immigration confinement, see Danielle C. Jefferis, 
Constitutionally Unaccountable: Privatized Immgration Detention, 95 INDIANA L.J. ___ (forthcoming 
2019) (on file with author).  
33 Id.  
34 Id.  
35 Devlin Barrett, Private-Prison Firm CCA to Rename Itself CoreCivic, WALL STREET J. (Oct. 28, 2016), 
https://www.wsj.com/articles/private-prison-firm-cca-to-rename-itself-corecivic-1477666800 (last visited 
Dec. 8, 2018). 
36 DETENTION WATCH NETWORK & CENTER FOR CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHTS, BANKING ON DETENTION: 
LOCAL LOCKUP QUOTAS AND THE IMMIGRANT DRAGNET 3 (2015); Madison Pauly, A Brief History of 
America’s Private Prison Industry, MOTHER JONES (Aug. 2016), 
https://www.motherjones.com/politics/2016/06/history-of-americas-private-prison-industry-timeline/; 
CHRISTINE BACON, THE EVOLUTION OF IMMIGRATION DETENTION IN THE UK: THE INVOLVEMENT OF 
PRIVATE PRISON COMPANIES, REFUGEE STUDIES CENTRE WORKING PAPER NO. 27 10 (2005).  
37 Shane Bauer, supra note 16, at 21 (“Before running prisons, Hutto had been a pastor, studied history, 
spent two years in the US Army, and did graduate work in education at the American University in 
Washington, DC.”). 
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somewhere to put 200 illegal criminal aliens by February 1st. Literally, we 
stopped in ten motels, then finally about 3am found one that might work. I 
asked if they would be interested in selling or leasing the motel. And after 
negotiating with the owner for several hours, he finally agreed.38 
Three years later, the Wackenhut Corrections Corporation, now known as the GEO 
Group, Inc. (GEO), received its first contract to run an immigration detention center.39 And 
with that, the industry’s two primary players today launched what has become an empire.40 
C. Scope 
Not only is the American immigration detention system the largest in the world, it is 
the most privatized in the world.41 Nearly 400,000 people are incarcerated under the 
government’s immigration detention authority each year, an annual figure that has seen 
consistent, substantial growth.42 The average daily population of people in immigration 
confinement has also increased exponentially in the past two decades,43 reaching nearly 
40,500 people per day in 2017.44 The federal government anticipated an even greater need 
to fund additional confinement when U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE) 
requested additional funding for up to 52,000 daily beds in fiscal year 2019.45 After an 
intense budget debate during the federal government shutdown that began in 2018 and 
carried into 2019, Congress declined ICE’s request and authorized detention-bed funding 
at 2018 levels—40,500 per day—in spite of Democrats’ efforts to reduce the number of 
detention beds even further.46 Notwithstanding Congress’s appropriated numbers, ICE 
regularly detains more people than its funding permits.47 
 
38 BACON, supra note 36, at 10. See also Bauer, supra note 16, at 14–15 (describing CoreCivic training 
video: "In the video Hutto and Beasley tell their company's origin story. In 1983, they recount, they won 
'the first contract ever to design, build, finance, and operate a secure correctional facility in the world.' . . . 
[Hutto] recalls the story of obtaining their first prison contract like an old man giving a blow-by-blow 
accounting of his winning high school touchdown. Rushed for time, he and Beasley convinced the owner of 
a motel in Houston to lease it to them, eventually hiring 'all his family' as staff to seal the deal. They then 
quickly surrounded the motel with a twelve-foot fence topped with coiled barbed wire. They left up the 
Day Rates Available sign. 'We opened the facility on Super Bowl Sunday the end of that January,' Hutto 
recalls. 'So about ten o'clock that night we start receiving inmates. I actually took their pictures and 
fingerprinted them. Several other people walked them to their 'rooms,' if you will, and we got our first day's 
pay for eighty-seven undocumented aliens.' Both men chuckle.").  
39 Pauly, supra note 36.  
40 For a fuller account of the history of immigration detention, including its privatization, see, e.g., Danielle 
C. Jefferis, Constitutionally Unaccountable: Privatized Immigration Detention, 95 INDIANA L.J. ___ 
(forthcoming 2019) (on file with author).  
41 DETENTION WATCH NETWORK, A TOXIC RELATIONSHIP: PRIVATE PRISONS AND U.S. IMMIGRATION 
DETENTION 2 (2016) (“[I]n addition to being remarkable for its size, the U.S. immigration detention system 
is an outlier for the degree to which it has been privatized.”).  
42 See, e.g., Danielle C. Jefferis, Constitutionally Unaccountable: Privatized Immigration Detention, 95 
INDIANA L.J. ___ (forthcoming 2019) (on file with author).  
43 Id.  
44 Id. 
45 DEP’T OF HOMELAND SECURITY, FY 2019 BUDGET IN BRIEF at 36 (2019), 
https://www.dhs.gov/sites/default/files/publications/DHS%20BIB%202019.pdf.   
46 Dara Lind, Congress’s Deal on Immigration Detention, Explained, VOX (Feb. 12, 2019), 
https://www.vox.com/2019/2/12/18220323/immigration-detention-beds-congress-cap.  
47 See, e.g., Caitlin Emma & Jennifer Scholtes,  Trump Administration Aims to Shift Money to Immigration 
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According to a 2018 report, ICE relies on more than 630 sites throughout the United 
States to confine people under its immigration-enforcement authority.48 Many of these 
facilities are state prisons or local jails that contract with the federal government to confine 
people among its own authority.49 Others are for-profit prisons run by private corporations 
and designed exclusively (or nearly exclusively) to detain people in the custody of 
immigration-enforcement authorities.50 
D. Conditions 
Conditions in private immigration prisons are poor. Detainees have succumbed to 
limb amputations, serious illnesses, and infections, and some have even died.51 ICE has 
acknowledged at least 185 deaths in immigration prisons and jails between October 2003 
and July 2018.52 At least twenty-two people have died in ICE custody in the last two 
years.53 Others, still, have endured physical abuse at the hands of staff and otherwise harsh 
conditions of confinement.54 
Indeed, the Department of Justice reported in 2019 that the number of people who 
had applied for voluntary departure since the 2016 election had risen significantly, 
 
Enforcement, POLITICO (Aug. 14, 2019), https://www.politico.com/story/2019/08/14/trump-administration-
federal-funding-ice-1662256.  
48 EMILY RYO & IAN PEACOCK, supra note 17, at 1. 
49Id. at 11 (“In fiscal year 2015, ICE used 638 facilities to detain noncitizens, including juveniles. By far, 
the largest category—43 percent—were facilities with intergovernmental service agreements (IGSAs). 
IGSAs are agreements between the federal government and a state or local government to provide detention 
beds in jails, prisons, or other local or state government detention facilities. These facilities are government 
owned, but they may be operated by either local or state agencies or by for-profit companies.”).  
50 Some immigration detention centers, such as the Aurora ICE Processing Center in Colorado, also confine 
people in the custody of the U.S. Marshals. See Our Locations: Aurora ICE Processing Center, THE GEO 
GROUP, INC., https://www.geogroup.com/FacilityDetail/FacilityID/31 (last visited May 8, 2019). 
51 See, e.g., Conor McCormick-Cavanagh, Democrats Probe ICE About Medical Conditions at Aurora 
Detention Facility,” VICE NEWS (Feb. 28, 2019), https://www.westword.com/news/jason-crow-sends-ice-
letter-about-medical-conditions-at-aurora-detention-facility-11252339 (last visited Mar. 2, 2019); Chris 
Walker, There’s Been Another Chicken Pox Outbreak at Immigrant Detention Facility, WESTWORD (Jan. 
31, 2019), https://www.westword.com/news/second-chicken-pox-outbreak-at-aurora-immigrant-detention-
center-puts-two-pods-in-quarantine-11210867 (last visited Mar. 2, 2019); Lisa Riordan Seville et al., 22 
Immigrants Died in ICE Detention Centers During the Past 2 Years, NBC NEWS (Jan. 6, 2019), 
https://www.nbcnews.com/politics/immigration/22-immigrants-died-ice-detention-centers-during-past-2-
years-n954781 (last visited Mar. 2, 2019); Pauly, supra note 36; Kassi Nelson, Trans Woman Dies in ICE 
Custody; Family Sues, KOB4 (Nov. 27, 2018), https://www.kob.com/albuquerque-news/trans-woman-dies-
after-detained-at-new-mexico-ice-facility/5157737/ (last visited Mar. 2, 2019); Chris Walker, ICE Defends 
a Chicken Pox Quarantine at Immigrant Detention Facility in Aurora, WESTWORD (Oct. 25, 2018),  
https://www.westword.com/news/varicella-outbreak-leads-to-a-quarantine-at-ice-detention-center-in-
aurora-10941507. See generally, CODE RED: THE FATAL CONSEQUENCES OF DANGEROUSLY SUBSTANDARD 
MEDICAL CARE IN IMMIGRATION DETENTION, Human Rights Watch, et al. (2018), 
https://www.hrw.org/sites/default/files/report_pdf/us0618_immigration_web2.pdf. 
52 Ryo & Peacock, supra note 17, at 5.   
53 Lisa Riordan Seville et al., supra note 51.  
54 See, e.g., Nina Shapiro, What Happened to Mergensana Amar? The Russian Immigrant’s Handwritten 
Note Raises Questions about Treatment at Northwest Detention Center, SEATTLE TIMES (Nov. 30, 2018), 
https://www.seattletimes.com/seattle-news/russian-immigrants-handwritten-note-leaves-many-questions-
about-treatment-at-northwest-detention-center/ (last visited Mar. 2, 2019); Alice Speri, At Largest ICE 
Detention Center in the Country, Guards Called Attempted Suicides “Failures”, INTERCEPT (Oct. 11, 
2018), https://theintercept.com/2018/10/11/adelanto-ice-detention-center-abuse/. 
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suggesting that for some people, the conditions in immigration detention are so dire that 
they would prefer to self-deport than stay in detention to fight their immigration cases.55 
Laura Rivera, an attorney with the Southern Povery Law Center, told Politico Magazine, 
“It speaks to the desperation of people in detention that they’d be trying to sign up in droves 
for this thing that actually causes them to be removed. They’ve got to be thinking that 
there’s no way out [of detention].”56 Alejandra Garcia Zamarrón, a woman whose case 
Politico featured, told the publication of the women with whom she was detained at the 
for-profit Irwin County Detention Center:57 “They’re tired of living here, of dealing with 
ICE, dealing with guards, dealing with injustice . . . They give up. They’d rather be 
deported than fight their case. We’re not criminal[s]. We just don’t have options.”58 
E. Profits  
Notwithstanding the conditions in private immigration prisons, the companies 
overseeing and managing the facilities have yielded substantial profits and growing 
revenue in recent years. GEO has reported regular profit increases over the last few years.59 
In 2018, GEO reported more than $2.3 billion in revenue, compared to just above $2.2 
billion in 2017 and nearly $2.18 billion in 2016.60 CoreCivic reported more than $1.8 
billion in total revenue for 2018 after generating more than $1.7 billion in 201761 and 
reported continued growth through the first quarter of 2019.62 In recent years, whenever 
the Trump administration has announced a new tough-on-immigration policy, these 
companies’ shareholders have seen a rapid spike in stock value.63 Their contracts with ICE 
totaled approximately $2 billion each year.64 
II.  THE SHORTCOMINGS OF PUBLIC GOVERNANCE 
While conditions in private immigration prisons are poor, the industry continues to 
 
55 Christie Thompson & Andrew R. Calderon, The Surprising New Effect of Trump’s Immigration 
Crackdown, POLITICO (May 8, 2019), https://www.politico.com/magazine/story/2019/05/08/self-
deportation-trump-immigration-policy-trend-226801. 
56 Id.  
57 The Irwin County Detention Center is run by LaSalle Corrections, a private corporation operating prisons 
in Louisiana, Texas, and Georgia. See generally, LaSalle Corrections, 
http://www.lasallecorrections.com/about-us/ (last visited May 8, 2019). 
58 Thompson and Calderon, supra note 55.  
59 THE GEO GROUP, INC., 2018 ANNUAL REPORT 1 (2018). 
60 Id. 
61 CORECIVIC, ANNUAL REPORT 54 (2018). 
62 GlobeNewswire, CoreCivic Reports First Quarter 2019 Financial Results, YAHOO! FINANCE (May 8, 
2019), https://finance.yahoo.com/news/corecivic-reports-first-quarter-2019-201500242.html (reporting 
total Q1 revenue was $484.1 million, up ten percent from prior quarter year).  
63 See, e.g., John Washington, Trump’s Immigration Policy ‘Fever Dream,’ THE NATION (Oct. 5, 2018), 
available at https://www.thenation.com/article/trumps-immigration-policy-fever-dream/ (last visited March 
2, 2019) (“[B]etween the announcement of the ‘zero tolerance’ policy and DHS’s June 22 request for 
information about the possibility of detaining an additional 15,000 people in family jails, the stocks of Geo 
Group and CoreCivic, the two largest for-profit immigration-detention corporations, increased 5.9 percent 
and 8.3 percent, respectively.”). 
64 See, e.g., John Burnett, Big Money as Private Immigrant Jails Boom, NPR (Nov. 21, 2017), 
https://www.npr.org/2017/11/21/565318778/big-money-as-private-immigrant-jails-boom (last visited 
March 2, 2019) (“ICE spends more than $2 billion a year on immigrant detention through private jails”). 
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expand and reap profits at record levels.65 Calls for change and effective public governance 
have largely fallen short at the federal level; however, some activity on state and local 
levels has been more promising. Still, those efforts have yet to make substantial progress 
toward stalling or shrinking the scope of the privatized immigration-detention apparatus.  
A. Federal Oversight 
A primary means of federal government oversight is through each agency’s Office 
of Inspector General (OIG). The Department of Homeland Security’s (DHS) OIG has 
attempted to investigate and report on conditions and concerns in private immigration 
prisons, but the effect of those efforts has been nearly imperctible.66 In September 2018, 
for example, the OIG issued a report after a surprise visit documenting troubling conditions 
in GEO’s Adelanto Processing Center, an immigration detention facility.67 The report 
detailed inspectors’ discovery of nooses in cells, misuses of solitary confinement, and 
delayed medical care.68 Two weeks later, in a rebuke of the OIG’s report, GEO hired a 
private company to conduct another inspection of the Adelanto Processing Center.69 The 
inspector of the private company, the Nakamoto Group, disagreed with the OIG’s report, 
 
65 See, e.g., DETENTION WATCH NETWORK, supra note 3, at 4; Norman Merchant, New deal keeps open 
facility that detains immigrant families, WASH. POST (Oct. 17, 2018), 
https://www.washingtonpost.com/national/new-deal-keeps-open-facility-that-detains-immigrant-
families/2018/10/17/31f50118-d22b-11e8-a4db-184311d27129_story.html; Jackie Speier, Immigration 
detention is a profitable business, S.F. CHRON. (Oct. 24, 2018), 
https://realm.hearstnp.com/connect/authorize?client_id=hdn.js&redirect_uri=https%3A%2F%2Fwww.sfchr
onicle.com%2Fhdn%2Fhrlm%2Fp%2Fcallback.html&response_type=id_token%20token&scope=openid%
20email%20hdn.sanfrancisco&state=dcc4a7c671134b7ba6c3aa63b41bf0ad&non; Carli Pierson, Don’t be 
Fooled by Trump’s Caravan Rhetoric - it’s Much More Profitable to Incarcerate Migrants Than to Stop 
Them at the Border, INDEPENDENT (Oct. 31, 2018), https://www.independent.co.uk/voices/trump-caravan-
migrants-detention-centres-ice-child-separation-a8610146.html (last visited Dec. 8, 2018); Pauly, supra 
note 36; CARL TAKEI ET AL., SHUTTING DOWN THE PROFITEERS: WHY AND HOW THE DEPARTMENT OF 
HOMELAND SECURITY SHOULD STOP USING PRIVATE PRISONS, ACLU 10, 
https://www.aclu.org/sites/default/files/field_document/white_paper_09-30-16_released_for_web-v1-
opt.pdf ("These trends have enriched private prison investors. In 2008, the two biggest private prison 
companies—Corrections Corporation of America (CCA) and GEO Group (GEO)—received a combined 
$307 million in revenue from ICE detention contracts. By 2015, that number had more than doubled, to 
more than $765 million.”); Esther Fung, Donald Trump Has Been Very Good for Publicly Listed Prison 
Owners, WALL ST. J. (Feb. 26, 2019), https://www.wsj.com/articles/donald-trump-has-been-very-good-for-
publicly-listed-prison-owners-11551189601 (last accessed March 2, 2019).  
66 See, e.g., Katherine Hawkins, POGO Testimony on Oversight of ICE Detention Centers, PROJ. ON GOV’T 
OVERSIGHT (Sept. 26, 2019), https://www.pogo.org/testimony/2019/09/pogo-testimony-on-oversight-of-
ice-detention-centers/ (describing “serious flaws in ICE’s inspection and oversight system and inhumane 
conditions in ICE detention centers”).   
67 Office of Inspector GEN., Management Alert⎯Issues Requiring Action at the Adelanto ICE Processing 
Center in Adelanto, California (Sept. 27, 2018), https://www.oig.dhs.gov/sites/default/files/assets/2018-
10/OIG-18-86-Sep18.pdf. 
68 Catherine E. Shoichet, Inspectors Found Nooses Hanging in Cells at an ICE Detention Facility, CNN 
(Oct. 3, 2018), https://www.cnn.com/2018/10/03/politics/immigrant-detention-adelanto-oig-
report/index.html. 
69 Katherine Hawkins, At Immigration Detention Facilities, ‘Inspectors for Hire’ Miss Signs of Neglect, Say 
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calling it “erroneous and inflammatory.”70 The company recommended that the OIG 
should “use inspectors with detention and corrections backgrounds for future inspections 
to avoid . . . embarrassment to their office and ICE, especially since the inaccuracies have 
now been reported by the news media as fact.”71 Notwithstanding the company’s 
representations, Nakamoto’s report contradicts not only the OIG’s report but also evidence 
of advocacy groups and the primary accounts of formerly detained individuals.72  
Another primary means of exercising oversight and imposing measures of 
accountability on private immigration prisons is through congressional action. Members of 
Congress have attempted to exercise oversight over private immigration prisons, only to 
be rebuffed by the DHS. Representative Jason Crow, whose Colorado district serves as 
home to GEO’s Aurora ICE Processing Center, attempted numerous times to visit the 
facility after hearing of infectious disease outbreaks and other concerns about conditions 
among individuals detained there and other concerns about conditions.73 ICE and GEO 
refused to permit his inspections until a pre-approved visit was scheduled twenty-four days 
after his first attempt.74 He and fellow members of Congress sent a letter in February 2019 
to then-Secretary of DHS Kirstjen Nielsen, requesting documentation and information 
about ICE’s infectious disease protocol.75 This request went unanswered.76 Crow is now 
leading an effort that would require immigration detention prisons to allow members of 
Congress to inspect their facilities within forty-eight hours of their request for such an 
inspection.77 The coalition’s letter to the Appropriations Subcommitee on Homeland 
Security details the myriad concerns with private immigration prisons across the country.78 
Lastly, with the possible exception of labor rights and wage theft class action lawsuits 
around the country,79 the judiciary is largely ill-equipped to provide oversight with respect 
to private immigration prisons because there are few federal causes of action available to 
bring private-prison actors into federal court.80 
 
70 Id.  
71 Id. 
72 Id. 
73 Conor McCormick-Cavanagh, Crow Pushes Congress to Stengthen Immigration Detention Facility 
Inspections, WESTWORD (Apr. 8, 2019), https://www.westword.com/news/jason-crow-pushes-congress-to-
strengthen-immigration-detention-facility-inspections-11302198 [hereinafter McCormick-Cavanagh, 
Crow]. 
74 Id.  
75 Letter from Jason Crow, Member of Congress, to Kristjen M. Nielsen, Sec’y of Homeland Security, Feb. 
20, 2019), https://crow.house.gov/sites/crow.house.gov/files/02-20-2019-Crow-Letter-to-DHS-regarding-
Denver-Contract-Detention-Facility.pdf. 
76 Conor McCormick-Cavanagh, Democrats Probe ICE About Medical Conditions at Aurora Detention 
Facility, WESTWORD (Feb. 28, 2019), https://www.westword.com/news/jason-crow-sends-ice-letter-about-
medical-conditions-at-aurora-detention-facility-11252339. 
77 Conor McCormick-Cavanagh, Crow, supra note 73.  
78 Letter to Chairwoman Lucille Roybal-Allard and Ranking Member Chuck Fleischmann, Appropriations 
Subcomm. on Homeland Security, U.S. H.R. (Apr. 4, 2019), 
https://images.westword.com/media/pdf/fy_2020_ice_detention_center_oversight_letter_w_sigs__1_.pdf. 
79 See, e.g., Complaint (Doc. 1), Menocal v. The GEO Group, Inc., No. 1:14-cv-02887-JLK-MEH (D. 
Colo., Oct. 22, 2014).  
80 See, e.g., Danielle C. Jefferis, Constitutionally Unaccountable: Privatized Immigration Detention, 95 
IND. L.J. ___ (forthcoming 2019) (on file with author). 
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B. State and Local Efforts 
Public governance on the state and local levels may provide some measure of 
accountability, but have likewise fallen short, particularly  in terms of advancing the goal 
of decarceration. Recently, activists in Illinois successfully lobbied the state legislature to 
extend a state-wide ban on private prisons to apply to immigration detention facilities.81 
The City of Adelanto, California decided to end its contract with GEO for the Adelanto 
ICE Processing Center, just weeks after the Orange County Sheriff announced he would 
no longer detain people in ICE custody in the county jail.82 Several weeks after the City’s 
announcement, however, ICE suggested it would contract directly with GEO to keep the 
prison open while members of the city council asked to revisit the decision, questioning 
whether the city manager has the authority to unilaterally withdraw the locality from its 
contract with GEO.83 In response, California’s Governor Gavin Newsom signed into law a 
commitment to ending most forms of privatized confinement in the state, including 
privatized immigration detention.84 Reportedly, ICE “stands to lose four privately run 
detention facilities holding roughly 4,000 people in California, unless the ban is challenged 
in court.”85 The law is slated to go into effect next year.86 
But days after the law’s passage, ICE posted a solicitation notice for three new 
detention facilities, with a total capacity of 6,750 people, seemingly in an attempt to open 
new private immigration detention facilities before the law takes effect.87 The notice seeks 
“turnkey ready” facilities and clarifies that the agency “will not accept proposals for 
constructing new facilities.88 The notice gave about two weeks for response.89 California’s 
legislation prevents the state from entering into any new contracts with private prison 
companies or renewing existing contracts—but only once the law takes effect.90 If ICE 
succeeds in securing the three new contracts in response to its solicitation, it appears those 
agreements would not be subject to the new law.91 
These efforts at the state and local level in Illinois and California are promising 
 
81 James Goodman, Saying ‘No’ to Immigrant Detention, PROGRESSIVE (May 8, 2019), 
https://progressive.org/dispatches/saying-no-to-immigrant-detention-goodman-190508/. 
82 Roxana Kopetman, Adelanto To End Immigrant Detention Contract with ICE, GEO Group, SAN 
BERNARDINO SUN (Mar. 28, 2019), https://www.sbsun.com/2019/03/28/adelanto-to-end-immigrant-
detention-contract-with-ice-geo-group/. 
83 Rebecca Plevin, Adelanto Moves To Revisit Ending Ccontract for Troubled Immigration Detention 
Facility, DESERT SUN (Apr. 11, 2019), 
https://www.desertsun.com/story/news/politics/immigration/2019/04/11/adelanto-wants-revisit-decision-
ending-immigrant-detention-facility-contract/3437933002/. 
84 See, e.g., Steve Gorman, California Bans Private Prisons and Immigration Detention Centers, REUTERS 
(Oct. 11, 2019), https://www.reuters.com/article/us-california-prisons/california-bans-private-prisons-and-
immigration-detention-centers-idUSKBN1WQ2Q9.  
85 Id.; see also Darwin Bond Graham, California Governor Signs Ban on Private Prisons, Setting Up Fight 
with Trump, GUARDIAN (Oct. 12, 2019), https://www.theguardian.com/us-news/2019/oct/11/california-
private-prison-ban-courts.  
86 Id. 
87 See, e.g., Nuria Marquez Martinez, ICE Is Rushing to Open For-Profit Detention Centers—Right Before 
California’s Ban Goes Into Effect, MOTHER JONES (Oct. 29, 2019), 
https://www.motherjones.com/politics/2019/10/ice-california-new-detention-facilities-private-profit/.  
88 Id.  
89 Id.  
90 Id. 
91 Id. 
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advances toward enforcing oversight mechanisms, resisting privatized immigration 
detention, and furthering the decarceration goal; however, they can go only so far. To date, 
issues of federalism and company strategy have precluded state and local efforts from 
having a substantial impact. Turning to private governance institutions may be necessary. 
III. TURNING TO PRIVATE GOVERNANCE INSTITUTIONS 
When the government fails to govern in a manner certain people or groups desire, 
those people and groups may turn to private governance institutions to govern or try to 
change the status quo.92 Private governance institutions are the means by which 
individuals, organizations, and communities aim to address the needs public governance 
has failed to address.93 In other words, “[p]rivate governance institutions provide 
governance without government.”94 This Part provides an overview of modern private 
governance movements and then discusses recent developments of private governance 
efforts with respect to privatized immigration confinement. Although nascent, these recent 
developments suggest private governance is one means by which people and groups have 
opposed to federal immigration-enforcement authorities’ increased reliance on migration-
related detention. The efforts may put meaningful pressure on the companies on which the 
government relies, in turn, to slow the growth of the immigration-detention apparatus.  
A. Private Governance, Generally 
Private governance institutions may take many forms.95 One area in which private 
governance institutions have been particularly active in recent years is with respect to 
environmental regulation. In this space, private entities have engaged in varied efforts 
across industries to advance environmental policies and practices that public regulation has 
failed to do.96 Within this movement, scholars have focused largely on two areas of private 
activity: shareholder actions and divestment campaigns.97  
These two areas highlight two primary means of private governance: divestment 
versus engagement, or “carrots” versus “sticks.”98 Each serves different but related goals. 
 
92 See, e.g., Roberts, supra note 9, at 67; Jonathan M. Gilligan, supra note 13, at 182 (“Private governance 
occurs when private entities—businesses, not-for-profit organizations, individuals, etc.—pursue a goal 
traditionally associated with public governance, such as reducing greenhouse gas emissions, through 
actions that produce broad influence over others.”).  
93 Roberts, supra note 9, at 67 (“Private governance institutions are limitless in their variety. Political 
science, sociology, law, and economics literature describes hundreds of variations of private governance 
institutions throughout the world that have developed their own community-based rules for resource 
management and conflict resolution.”). 
94 Id. at 67. For a full account and analysis of the theory of private governance institutions, see Professor 
Roberts’s full piece. See generally id.  
95 Id. 
96 Id. at 68 (describing “education and mobilization initiatives, firm contractual agreements, corporate 
social responsibility programs, socially responsible investment, codes of conduct, environmental 
management systems, disclosure and reporting initiatives, learning initiatives, models and meta-standards, 
cooperatives, and voluntary standards, certification, and labeling mechanisms”).  
97 See generally Jonathan M. Gilligan, supra note 13; Surbhi Sarang, Combating Climate Change Through 
a Duty To Divest, 49 COLUM. J.L. & SOC. PROBS. 295 (2016); Michael P. Vandenbergh, Private 
Environmental Governance, 99 CORNELL L. REV. 129 (2013). 
98 Gilligan, supra note 13, at 188–89. 
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Divestment or “exit” “can serve to disassociate investors from firms they find morally 
repugnant or embarrassing to be publicly assocated with.”99 Critics often view “exit” as a 
crude, all-or-nothing tool, “with little nuance and prone to backfiring.”100 The impact is 
driven largely by the scope of divestment. If the campaign is one involving individual 
activist-investors, and their fraction is small, their divestment will likely not effect the 
corporatin’s market value in any meaningful way.101 Such efforts may embolden the 
corporation to continue on the path that inspired the divestment in the first place, while 
rendering the once-activist-investors voiceless and unable to make any further impact.102 
The “exit” may have “sent a message” but the impact of that message is often difficult to 
measure or impermanent unless the “exiter” is large enough to garner attention or inflict 
reputational harm.103 
Engagement, on the other hand, may provide a more nuanced form of private 
governance than divestment or “exit.” That is, when shareholders remain engaged in the 
corporation and take action from within, their voice may be louder.104 “Voice-centered 
engagement offers greater opportunity for nuance and give-and-take than divestment . . . 
Not only among investors but more broadly throughout society, voice has been an under-
utilized response to dissatisfaction. Thus, voice is more likely to be noticed when it is 
used.”105  
Recent shareholder and divestment actions targeted at the for-profit prison industry 
and, specifically, privatized immigration detention show that these private governance 
efforts may be more effective than the public governance activities discussed in Part II 
when it comes to detention oversight and advancing decarceration.  
B. Private Governance of Privatized Incarceration 
1. Shareholder Actions 
Corporate shareholders have taken action recently in at least two notable ways with 
respect to privatized immigration confinement. In late 2018, shareholders of GEO and 
CoreCivic filed shareholder resolutions against both companies seeking to prevent the 
entities from separating migrant families apprehended at or near the U.S.-Mexico border.106 
 
99 Id. at 189.  
100 Id. at 190. 
101 Id.  
102 Id. (“If demand for shares is inelastic, and if activists constitute a small fraction of investors, then 
divestment will not affect a firm’s market value. Therefore, the effect of an exit would largely be to remove 
dissidents from the conversation without providing any offsetting financial pressure. This would ultimately 
reduce, rather than increase, the incentives for the firm to change.”).  
103 Id. at 190–91 (“Proponents of divestment argue that the most important and influential consequences of 
divestment are not its direct impacts on share prices, but the message it sends. Divestments by large 
investors tend to get significant media coverage, which can damage companies’ reputations.”).  
104 Id. at 191.  
105 Id.  
106 Press Release, Prison Legal News, Family Separation Shareholder Resolution Filed with CoreCivic, 
GEO Group, PRISON LEGAL NEWS (Dec. 4, 2018), 
https://www.humanrightsdefensecenter.org/action/news/2018/family-separation-shareholder-resolution-
filed-corecivic-geo-group/ [hereinafter Prison Legal News, Family Separation]; see also Press Release, 
Prison Legal  News, GEO Group Objects to Shareholder Resolution on Immigrant Family Separation, 
HUMAN RIGHTS DEFENSE CENTER (Jan. 7, 2019), 
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The supporting statement detailed the track record of systemic concerns over conditions in 
GEO and CoreCivic immigration prisons, outlining a history of sexual abuse complaints, 
hunger strikes, deaths in custody, and labor violations.107  Both companies objected to the 
proposed resolutions and asked the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) to issue a 
“no-action” ruling, meaning the SEC would not recommend or take enforcement action 
against the companies.108 They also requested the SEC exclude the proposed resolutions 
from the shareholder’ packets distributed at the companies’ annual meetings and from a 
shareholder vote.109 The SEC upheld the companies’ objections, precluding the resolutions 
from reaching the shareholders. However, these shareholder actions placed both companies 
under public scrutiny, drawing SEC and media attention.110 
In 2019, GEO shareholders successfully passed a resolution demanding GEO to 
better report human rights policies and violations to investors.111 Specifically, the proposed 
resolution “asks GEO’s board [to] report annually on how the Company implements the 
portion of its Global Human Rights Policy that addresses ‘Respect for Our Inmates and 
Detainees.’”112 The two paragraphs that comprise this portion of the policy describe the 
company’s vision with respect to ensuring the safety and well-being of the people whom it 
incarcerates, as well as its commitment to “support the ability of inmates and detainess to 
develop the values and skills needed to complete their terms, and upon release, become 
productive and law abiding members of society.113 Much like it did with the earlier 
resolution, GEO responded to the proposal by requesting a “no-action” ruling but on this 
proposal, the SEC disagreed.114 The proposed resolution went before the shareholders at 
the company annual meeting. A majority of the shareholders passed the resolution, which 
required GEO to release a human rights report—or, a Human Rights and Environmental, 




107 Prison Legal News, Family Separation, supra note 106. 
108 THE OFFICE OF INVESTOR EDUCATION AND ADVOCACY, No Action Letters (modified March 23, 2017), 
https://www.sec.gov/fast-answers/answersnoactionhtm.html.  
109 Travis Loller, Companies Argue Against Proposal Not To House Separated Kids, AP NEWS (Jan. 8, 
2019), https://www.apnews.com/4769fe3da531446cba1f08c313e5ab00. 
110 Letter from Kasey L. Robinson, Special Counsel, U.S. Securities & Exch. Comm’n, to Esther Moreno, 
Akerman LLP (Mar. 15, 2019), https://www.sec.gov/divisions/corpfin/cf-noaction/14a-
8/2019/alexfriedmanngeo031519-14a8.pdf; see also Jerry I Press Release, Prison Legal News, Private 
Prison Companies Successfully Oppose Shareholder Resolutions Against Housing Separated Immigrant 
Children and Parents, Prison Legal News (Mar. 20, 2019), https://www.prisonlegalnews.org/in-the-
news/2019/private-prison-companies-successfully-oppose-shareholder-resolutions-against-housing-
separated-immigrant-children-and-parents/. 
111 Jerry Iannelli, GEO Group’s Own Shareholders Concerned About Human Rights in the Company’s 
Prisons, MIAMI NEW TIMES (May 7, 2019), https://www.miaminewtimes.com/news/geo-group-
shareholders-concerned-about-human-rights-violations-at-private-prison-giant-11166775. 
112 Letter from Reverend Bryan V. Pham, USA W. Soc’y of Jesus, to U.S. Secs. & Exch. Comm’n Jesuits 
West (Feb. 15, 2019), https://www.sec.gov/divisions/corpfin/cf-noaction/14a-8/2019/usawestetal031519-
14a8.pdf.  
113 GEO GROUP, GLOBAL HUMAN RIGHTS POLICY at 3, 
https://www.geogroup.com/Portals/0/PREA_Certifications/Human_Rights_Policy.pdf. 
114 Letter from Frank Pigott, Attorney-Adviser, U.S. Secs. & Exch. Comm’n, to Esther Moreno, Akerman 
LLP, U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission (Mar. 15, 2019), https://www.sec.gov/divisions/corpfin/cf-
noaction/14a-8/2019/usawestetal031519-14a8.pdf. 
115  Iannelli, supra note 111. The GEO Group Publishes First-Ever Human Rights and ESG Report, Yahoo 
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2. Divestment Activity 
In March 2019, in an unprecedented move, JPMorgan Chase, one of the nation’s 
largest banks, announced it would no longer finance or invest in private prison 
corporations.116 In a written statement announcing the divestment, the company said, 
“JPMorgan Chase has a robust and well-established process to evaluate the sectors that we 
serve. As part of this process, we will no longer bank the private-prison industry.”117 Wells 
Fargo soon followed.118 Stocks of the two largest private-prison companies took a drastic 
hit in the aftermath of the banks’ announcements.119 Soon, at least six more of the nation’s 
largest banks had committed publicly to ending financing for the private-prison industry, 
leaving the industry with a reported eighty-seven percent financing gap, falling credit 
ratings, and investor fallback.120 By October 2019, all publicly known banking partners for 
one of the industry’s leaders had committed to withdrawing their financial support, and the 
leading stock prices for the industry’s top companies were “near historic lows.”121 By one 
report, the stock prices dipped to their lowest point since 2016, when the Obama 
administration announced it was ending the use of private prisons on the federal level.122 
Here, the voice of the “exiters” is a loud one. Unlike, perhaps, the exit campaigns of 
individual activist-investors in other industries, the big banks’ divestment from the prison 
prison industry has made a statement. The actions have garnered significant media 
coverage.123 And others have taken notice, leading to the divestment or likely divestment 
of several other major investors in the companies.124 
 
Finance (Sept. 26, 2019), https://finance.yahoo.com/news/geo-group-publishes-first-ever-123000649.html. 
The seventy-seven page report appears to focus on the second paragraph of the “Respect for Our Inmates 
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Activists Applaud, N.Y. TIMES (Mar. 6, 2019), https://www.nytimes.com/2019/03/06/business/jp-morgan-
prisons.html. 
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prison-stocks-take-big-hit/#535e7aa91a3b (reporting stocks of two largest private-prison companies, GEO 
Group and CoreCivic, dropped sixteen and eight percent respectively in the day following banks’ 
divestment announcement). 
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fy19-shareholder-call-discusses-divestment-from-banks-prison-abuse-and-protestors-11310719. 
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the Beginning, MOTHER JONES (March 7, 2019), https://www.motherjones.com/crime-justice/2019/03/jp-
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Indeed, the impacted private prison firms have had no choice but to also take notice. 
In a quarterly earnings call, for example, GEO’s founder and CEO told shareholders, “We 
recognize that media coverage of overcrowded border patrol facilities and the 
announcement by a handful of our financial institutions discontinuing future financing has 
caused volatility in our equity and debt markets.”125 He continued, “Our shareholders 
should take comfort in knowing that we continue to have strong banking relationships with 
several dozen lenders and financial institutions in our senior credit facility.”126 CoreCivic’s 
CEO called the divestment actions “a result of politically motivated threats.”127 
CONCLUSION 
 Immigration detention is expanding rapidly, with more than 52,000 people confined 
pursuant to the federal government’s immigration-enforcement authority every day, and 
approximately two-thirds of those people behind the walls of for-profit prisons.128 
Conditions in the for-profit prisons are dreadful, leading to untreated medical conditions, 
infectious disease outbreaks, and deaths.129 As described above, public governance has 
come up short in recent years with respect to advancing the goal of decarceration and 
improving conditions inside private immigration prisons.  
Recent efforts of private governance institutions may fill in the gap. Shareholder 
actions and divestment activity with respect to the private prison industry have garnered 
significant attention. The GEO shareholders resolution led to the company’s first-ever 
release of a social responsibility report. The major banks’ divestment from the private-
prison industry represents a loss of millions of dollars of capital for the corporations 
managing and profiting from privatized immigration detention, and sends a compelling 
signal from Wall Street that a company’s conduct, not just its bottom line, matters. Stocks 
of the two largest private-prison companies took a drastic hit in the aftermath of the banks’ 
announcements. Perhaps signalling that the strategy is advancing certain goals, GEO 
warned its investors that growing public pressure to divest from the private prison industry 
“could have a material adverse effect” on its business.130 In light of the ineffectiveness of 
public governance institutions in this space, early outcomes suggest these sorts of private 
governance institutions may be one promising method to draw attention to the scope of and 
conditions in for-profit immigration detention centers, to improve those conditions, and to 
stop the overall growth of the immigration detention apparatus. 
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